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Abstract  
This paper develops an extended general equilibrium model of international trade in order to 
analyze the welfare effects of agricultural trade liberalization if a large country influences its 
terms of trade by means of environmental policy. We derive globally optimal first-best and 
second-best environmental and trade policy combinations as a benchmark for assessing the 
trade-distorting character of strategically motivated environmental policies and demonstrate 
that if second-best rather than first-best policies are chosen as a benchmark the conclusions 
may differ not only in magnitude but also in direction. We further demonstrate that if a 
Pigouvian instrument is transformed into a strategic environmental policy, following trade 
liberalization, the global welfare effect is unambiguously positive. We thereby prove that the 
distorting effect of an optimal tariff is generally greater than that of a strategically motivated 
environmental policy. 
  2Introduction  
The liberalization of agricultural trade and the increased recognition in policy of the 
environmental impacts of agriculture are two important trends affecting world agriculture at 
the turn of the century. Both trends are widely regarded by economists as necessary for 
social welfare improvements, yet they have given rise to tensions in trade talks. On the one 
hand, policy makers in Europe and parts of Asia fear that trade liberalization and reduction 
of agricultural support may adversely affect the positive environmental aspects of agriculture 
and the achievement of domestic environmental goals. On the other hand, free trade 
proponents are concerned that some countries might use the positive environmental aspects 
of agriculture as an excuse to further a protectionist trade agenda or to manipulate the terms 
of trade in their favor. An important issue for the WTO process will be to decide how the 
trade-distorting character of environmental policies can be assessed. This paper deals with 
this question in two ways: first, by analyzing the incentives for a large country to distort its 
environmental policy and, second, by examining how distorted environmental policies affect 
global welfare. 
The literature on trade and the environment demonstrates that a large country may have 
strategic incentives to choose an environmental policy that deviates from a Pigouvian (1920) 
tax or subsidy, since it can take advantage of its monopolistic price leverage in the world 
market. Several studies have specified strategic environmental policies for large countries 
trading on international markets. Building upon Bhagwati and Ramaswami’s (1963) theory 
of an optimal tariff, Bhagwati et al. (1969) and Kemp and Nagishi (1969) demonstrate that in 
the presence of domestic production externalities, the optimal policy response for a large 
country is a combined production tax and tariff. Vandendorpe (1972) and Markusen (1975) 
specify the condition for a large country’s domestically optimal policy, depending on 
whether the country is restricted to consumption or production taxes. Krutilla (1991) also 
  3demonstrates that the domestically optimal environmental policy partially substitutes for an 
optimal tariff and thus deviates from the Pigouvian tax or subsidy. While Markusen (1975) 
and Krutilla (1991) consider competitive supply markets, Kennedy (1994), Conrad (1993), 
Markusen et al. (1993), Barrett (1994), Rauscher (1994) and Ulph (1994a; 1994b; 1996) 
analyse domestically optimal environmental policies by assuming a limited number of firms 
competing in Cournot fashion. Starting from a similar framework of oligopolistic supply 
markets, Burguet and Sempere (2003) demonstrate how the replacement of optimum tariffs 
by strategic environmental policy affects social welfare. Burguet and Sempere (2003) 
assume constant marginal costs of production in order to analyze the welfare effects of 
symmetrical tariff reductions within a bilateral trade model of two countries and two firms 
competing in a single good. 
This paper extends the literature in a number of ways. First, it analyzes the trade-distorting 
effects of strategic environmental policies. Second, the modeling approach considers 
competitive rather than oligopolistic supply markets, since competition is a common feature 
of agricultural markets. Models of competitive supply markets have also been employed by 
Markusen (1975) and Krutilla (1991), but without analyzing the impact of strategic 
environmental policy on global welfare. The welfare effects of trade liberalization and 
strategic environmental policy have so far, to the best of our knowledge, only been studied 
by Burguet and Sempere (2003). However, this was within a framework of oligopolistic 
markets and was based on the restrictive assumption of constant marginal production costs. 
Third, the analysis is framed in a context of second-best to account for the fact that policy 
instruments are hardly ever set at their optimal levels. The paper demonstrates that, as long 
as trade is not fully liberalized, the Pigouvian tax or subsidy will not maximize global 
welfare. We thus argue that Pigouvian policies are an inappropriate benchmark for 
classifying strategic environmental policies as trade-distorting or otherwise. Finally, we 
  4deliver a proof that trade liberalization generally enhances global welfare when a large 
country substitutes a strategic environmental policy for optimal conventional border 
protection measures. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. After presenting the model, we derive domestically 
optimal policies analytically, i.e. environmental and trade policy combinations that 
maximize the welfare of an individual country. We then compare these policies with the 
corresponding policy mix that maximizes global welfare. Next, we analyze domestically and 
globally optimal policy combinations in a framework of second-best and derive conclusions 
as to whether a given environmental policy should or should not be classified as trade-
distorting. The paper then goes on to prove that a unilateral tariff reduction, when 
accompanied by a simultaneous strategic change in the environmental policy, will generally 
enhance global welfare.  
The model  
We consider a general equilibrium trade model consisting of two large countries trading in 
goods a and b. The home country (Country 1) produces quantity   of good a at cost 
a S1
( )
a a S C 1 1 . Analogously, the cost of producing good b is  ( )
b b S1 1 C . The production of commodity 
a in Country 1 is associated with external environmental effects  ( )
a
1
a S 1 E . We assume that the 
environmental impact of production is not internalized into the market system and that the 
externality does not spill over national boundaries. We further assume that production of 
good  b has either no impact on the environment or that environmental externalities are 
efficiently internalized. Both goods are also produced in the rest of the world (Country 2); 
however, in the interest of simplicity, the environmental impact of production abroad is 
considered to be neutral.  
  5Country 1 has two policy instruments at its disposal: a tariff (T) on good a, defined as a 
specific tax or subsidy on exports or imports, and an environmental tax (t) on commodity a, 
modeled as a tax or subsidy on production. We assume that there is no possibility of 
retaliatory policy measures by Country 2. Hence, tax and tariff instruments are, by 
assumption, not available to the regulatory authorities abroad and are generally not used for 
good b.  
The home country’s supply (S ,   and demand ( ,  ) are defined as 
functions of domestic supply and demand prices, respectively, whereas Country 2’s supply 
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Building upon these relationships, social welfare functions can be derived for the home 
country and the rest of the world. Country 1’s welfare (W ) is defined as the sum of 
consumer surplus and ‘producer benefit’ of both commodities and includes also tax 
revenues, tariff revenues and the value of the environmental externality:
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Analogously, expression (2) defines Country 2’s social welfare (W ) as the aggregate of 
consumer surplus and producer benefit for goods a and b:  
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3 We assume supply and demand functions to be interdependent:  ; 
;  ;  ; S ; 
;  ; D .  
)) ( , ( ) (
1 1 1 1 1












w P P P ( ) ( 2 2
a a
w
a P s P =






w P P P









b P P P s P S =









b P P P s P S =
)) ( , ( ) (
1 1 1 1 1





a P P P d P D =









a P P P d P D =
( ) ( 1 1
b b
w
b d P D =
) ( 2 2
b b
w
b d P =







4 We define ‘producer benefit’ as the difference between total revenues and total costs, which differs from 
producer surplus, which measures the difference between total revenues and total variable costs.  
  6We assume that welfare in the home country and welfare in the rest of the world are not 
interdependent, hence global welfare can be depicted as the sum of welfare in the two 
countries:  . Furthermore, the model is based on the trade equilibrium 
requirement of excess supply in Country 1 being equal to excess demand in Country 2 for 
both goods:  
2 1 W W W + =










a a , , , , 2 2 1 1
1 1 − = −                                      (3) 










b b , , , , 2 2 1 1
1 1 − = −  .                               (4) 
Financial trade accounts in both countries are assumed to be balanced, hence the following 
constraints apply:  





b b P S D P D S 1 1 1 1 − = −                                            (5) 





b b P S D P D S 2 2 2 2 − = −  .                                           (6) 
For simplicity’s sake, transaction and transportation costs are neglected. Hence, the margin 
between the home country’s demand price  for good a and the world price   is solely 
determined by the tariff rate, whereas the environmental tax rate exclusively determines the 
difference between domestic supply price   and demand price for good a. The model is 
completed by the supposition that markets operate perfectly, and consequently that supply 
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  7Environmental and trade policies in a first-best world  
In the absence of international trade agreements, Country 1 is free to set its environmental 
tax and tariff rates simultaneously in order to maximize national social welfare. The first-
order condition for an interior maximum is obtained by taking the partial derivatives of the 
domestic welfare function W  with respect to the tax and tariff rates, setting these as equal to 
zero and solving simultaneously (
1
0 1 1 = ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ T W t W ). Taking this rule and applying the 
constraints in equations (3) – (8) to simplify the result, we obtain:
5  
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and 
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where  ; 
a a a D S X 1 1 1 − = a a D
a
S
a P D P S













w P P P P ∂ ∂ = ε . 
Simultaneously solving equation (9) and (10) yields:
6 
a a S E t 1 1
* *
1 ∂ ∂ − =                                                  (11) 
and 
() β ε − − = 1 1
* *
1
a X T  .                                                        (12) 
The results show that the domestically optimal environmental tax t  is equal to the 
Pigouvian tax or subsidy, while the domestically optimal first-best tariff T  is identical to 
Bhagwati and Ramaswami’s (1963) optimal tariff of international trade theory. Equations 





  8environmental regulation, whereas trade-related issues are most efficiently dealt with 
through tariff instruments. 
To assess the trade-distorting character of this domestically optimal policy set one needs to 
derive as a benchmark the policy set that maximizes global welfare. We will refer to the 
latter as the globally (as opposed to domestically) optimal policy set. It is obtained by setting 






































































































a β α β
β α
  .                     (14) 
Solving equations (13) and (14) for the tax and tariff rates simultaneously, we obtain:
8  
a a
w S E t 1 1
* * ∂ ∂ − =                                              (16) 
0
* * = w T   .                              ( 1 7 )  
The globally optimal first-best policy solution for an open economy is thus free trade 
(T ) combined with a Pigouvian tax or subsidy. The intuition behind this finding is that 
free trade between different nations within an open world economy is identical to free trade 
between different regions within a closed economy.   
0
* * = w
Taking the globally optimal policy set (equations 16 and 17) as a benchmark for judging 
domestically optimal policy combinations (equations 11 and 12), we conclude that a large 
 
5 Proof in Appendix 1 and 4. 
6 Proof in Appendix 10-12. 
7 The global welfare impact of environmental policies as represented by equation (9) seems to be unaffected by 
the interaction between the markets of goods a and b. However, the interaction between the two commodity 
markets is implicitly accounted for by the way supply and demand functions are specified as being 
interdependent between markets. Proof in Appendix 1- 6. 
8 Proof for first- and second-order condition for an interior maximum is given in Appendix 7-9. 
  9country has an incentive to distort its trade policy only, while setting its environmental tax 
rate at the globally optimal level. The rationale for strategic trade policies can be seen from 
the optimal tariff formula in equation (12). If Country 1 is a net importer ( ), its 
optimum tariff (T ) will be higher the stronger its influence on the terms of trade. 







is, thus the smaller that the elasticity of foreign demand and supply is. We thus conclude that 
the larger the size of Country 1 in relation to the rest of the world, the stronger is the terms of 
trade effect.  
The terms of trade effect is also determined by the parameterε , which is an expression of the 
responsiveness of world price changes of one commodity to the world price of the other 
commodity. If commodities a and b are substitutes, a real price rise (reduction) of good a 
will generally lower (raise) the real price of good b, resulting in a negative value of ε .
9 As a 
consequence, the terms of trade effect will be greater the stronger the influence of price 
changes of good a on the price of good b (the smallerε ). The rationale behind this 
observation is that financial gains from trade due to price changes of good a will be 
enhanced by terms of trade gains in the market of good b.
10  
Environmental policy in a world of second best 
We now turn to the case where Country 1 faces tariff reduction requirements as a 
consequence of an international trade agreement. With the tariff rate now being imposed 
exogenously, the home country can only vary its environmental tax rate to maximize its 
 
                                                 
9 We define real  prices in a way such that the value of the total world output is constant 




w S S P S S P ). See Appendix 14. 
  10welfare. The analysis is thus framed in the context of a second-best world, which will be 
denoted by one asterisk in the subsequent exposition. With a given tariff rate, the 
domestically optimal second-best environmental tax t  can be obtained by resolving 
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t  .                                 (18) 
Equation (18) shows that the domestically optimal second-best environmental policy 
deviates from the globally optimal Pigouvian tax or subsidy. Depending on the size of the 
trade flow ( ) and the tariff rate 
a X1 T , the environmental tax/subsidy rate may be higher or 
lower than the Pigouvian rate. However, it is not clear whether in a second-best world the 
Pigouvian solution is the appropriate criterion for classifying domestic environmental 
policies as trade-distorting or otherwise. We argue that it is not: if trade is not fully 
liberalized (T ), a Pigouvian environmental policy instrument may result in a lower level 
of global welfare than a strategically motivated second-best policy. We argue that if the first-
best policy solution is out of reach for political or technical reasons, the globally optimal 
second-best environmental policy is a more appropriate benchmark for deciding whether 
domestic environmental policies should be classified as trade-distorting. The globally 
optimal second-best environmental policy is the one that maximizes global welfare subject to 
the constraint that the tariff rate is predetermined exogenously. It is obtained by solving 
equation (13) for the environmental tax rate:
0 ≠
















t .                                             (19) 
 
0
10 Equation (12) further shows that if the two commodities  are independent ( ), partial and general 
equilibrium analysis will lead to the same result with regard to the domestically optimal environmental 
policy. 
= ε




a a Pigou S E 1 1 ∂ ∂ − =
0
t ) for any non-zero tariff rate because the optimal 
environmental policy would need to correct for an existing trade distortion. In the presence 
of a positive tariff (T ), the globally optimal environmental tax will be higher than the 
Pigouvian tax, given that supply curves are positively and demand curves are negatively 
sloped. This finding is plausible, since a higher environmental tax curtails domestic 
production, which was previously raised by the distortive tariff. Based on the reverse 
reasoning, we can state that the globally optimal environmental tax will generally be lower 
than the Pigouvian tax if the tariff is negative.  
>
A comparison of equation (18) and equation (19) shows that the domestically optimal 
second-best environmental policy generally differs from the globally optimal one, this being 
due to Country 1’s influence on its terms of trade, represented by the first term in (18).
13 The 
strength of the terms of trade effect is negatively correlated with the elasticity of foreign 
supply and demand. The terms of trade effect is also large when the elasticity of domestic 
demand is low (indicated by a low absolute value of  a D
a P D
1 1 ∂ ∂ ). The latter implies that the 
domestic supply sector is large relative to the domestic demand sector. 
 
We further conclude that, given normal properties of supply and demand functions,   will 
be smaller than   if Country 1 is an importer. The rationale behind this observation is 
straightforward: a lower environmental tax rate stimulates domestic production; this causes 






11 Proof in Appendix 10. 
12 Proof in Appendix 7. 
13 It is assumed that there is trade between Country 1 and the rest of the world ( ).  0 1 ≠
a X
  12suggestion that trade liberalization may lower environmental standards and thereby lead to 
ecological dumping.  
 
Welfare effects of trade liberalization  
We now turn to the question of how trade liberalization affects world welfare if a large 
country substitutes a strategically motivated environmental policy for a tariff. A global 
welfare improvement as a result of unilateral trade liberalization requires the marginal 




1 < dT T t
* *
1 >
dW ), given that 
the large country is a net importer ( ) and operates a positive tariff (T ). Taking 
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Since the first-order condition for a domestically optimal environmental policy will be 
maintained, as Country 1 liberalizes trade, the derivative  dT dt can be derived from the 
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Substituting (22) into (20) yields: 









































=  .               (23) 





































































,   .                 (24) 
If supply and demand curves are assumed to be well-behaved and convex, then  0 < ∂ ∂ t β . 
Hence, if  0 < ∂t ∂ε , we can prove that equation (24) assumes a negative value for any 
. The sign for  0 1 <
a X t ∂ ∂ε can be determined as follows: given perfectly operating factor 
and product markets, the price ratio between commodities a and b must be equal to the slope 















= −                             ( 2 5 )  
where S  and  . 
a a a
w S S 2 1 + =
b b b
w S S S 2 1 + =
We define real  market prices so that the value of total world output is fixed 
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Equation (27) proves that  0 < ∂ ∂ t ε , which is the requirement for expression (24) to assume 
negative values for any  . This provides the proof for the supposition that the global  0 1 <
a X
 
                                                 




a S E ∂ ). Proof in 
Appendix 13. 
15 Proof in Appendix 14. 
  14welfare effect of reducing an optimal tariff is unambiguously positive – even if a country 
acts strategically in setting its domestic policies following trade liberalization. However, it is 
important to note that the positive global welfare change represented by equation (24) does 
not imply that both countries benefit equally from trade liberalization. Although Country 1’s 
optimal adjustment to trade liberalization is a switch towards a strategically motivated 
environmental policy, its social welfare will fall below the level prior to trade liberalization, 
because the country moves from a first-best to a second-best policy solution. In contrast, the 
rest of the world will unambiguously gain from trade liberalization – even if Country 1 acts 
strategically in implementing its environmental policy. This finding is derived from the 
observation that global welfare increases following trade liberalization. Hence, the welfare 
gain for the rest of the world must outweigh the welfare loss for the home country. From this 
we may conclude that the distorting effect of an optimal tariff is generally greater than the 
trade distortions caused by strategic environmental policies. This is plausible in as much as 
social welfare gains for one country, as a result of terms of trade improvements, are 
generally achieved at the expense of global welfare losses for the rest of the world. Terms of 
trade improvements are maximized by an optimal tariff; this explains why an optimal tariff 
policy is more trade-distorting than a strategic environmental policy. 
Expression (24) also shows that the size and direction of global welfare change are not 
dependent on the sign or magnitude of an environmental externality, since 
a a S E 1 1 ∂ ∂ cancels 
out as the welfare change is calculated. Hence, if production is not linked to any 
environmental externalities ( 0 1 1 = ∂
a a S E ∂ ), equation (18) suggests that a large country facing 
a tariff reduction requirement may still introduce a production tax or subsidy, which it may 
choose to label an environmental tax/subsidy, even if there are de facto no environmental 
externalities. 
 
  15Conclusions 
This paper develops an extended general equilibrium model of international trade where the 
production of one commodity is associated with an environmental externality. The model is 
employed to derive domestically and globally optimal first-best and second-best 
environmental and trade policy combinations. We prove that free trade combined with a 
Pigouvian tax or subsidy is the first-best policy combination that is appropriate for 
maximizing global welfare. This implies that the optimal environmental policy for an open 
economy is the same as the one for a closed economy, so long as there are no trade 
restrictions. Conversely, trade liberalization is the globally optimal policy response if all 
environmental externalities are fully internalized. In both cases, it is assumed that the 
distortion being dealt with is the only market imperfection and that its removal will lead to 
the globally optimal first-best policy solution.  
It appears logical to choose the first-best policy prescriptions as the benchmark for 
classifying strategically motivated environmental and trade policies as trade-distorting or 
otherwise. In practice, however, neither trade nor environmental policies are usually set at 
their globally optimal levels, implying that the correction of one distortion will not 
necessarily enhance global welfare. We argue that globally optimal second-best 
environmental policies provide a more appropriate benchmark against which to assess the 
trade-distorting character of strategic environmental policies. We have derived such second-
best policies analytically and demonstrated how they differ from the Pigouvian prescription, 
because they need to correct for existing market distortions. These policies may thus be 
classified as ‘trade-correcting’. We have demonstrated that if trade-correcting rather than 
first-best policies are chosen as benchmarks for classifying strategically motivated 
environmental policies as trade-distorting or otherwise, the conclusions may differ not only 
  16in size but also in direction. Recommendations as to how an environmental policy should be 
adjusted can be contradictory, since the classification of a policy as distorting depends 
crucially on the choice of the benchmark.  
Finally, we demonstrated that the introduction of a strategic environmental policy can be 
classified as trade-distorting because it lowers global welfare – compared with the globally 
optimal policy mix of a Pigouvian tax or subsidy and a zero tariff. However, if a country acts 
strategically, this will not necessarily undermine the standard policy proposition that free 
trade enhances global efficiency. We have proved that if trade liberalization is accompanied 
by a switch from a Pigouvian tax or subsidy to a strategic environmental policy, the global 
welfare effects are unambiguously positive for all well-behaved demand and supply 
functions. This finding is plausible, in as much as a large country will be better off with an 
optimal tariff rather than a strategic environmental policy, but this is achieved at the expense 
of even greater welfare losses for the rest of the world. We thus conclude that the distorting 
effect of an optimal tariff is generally greater than that of a strategic environmental policy if 
the optimal tariff cannot be implemented.  
 
  17Appendices 
Appendix 1: The partial derivative of Country 1’s welfare function with respect to t  
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1 1 1 α            (b) 
where  a a D
a
S
a P D P S
1 1 1 1 ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ = α  
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This can be simplified by making use of equation (7):  






















a P D P S ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ = 2 2 β                 














































































1                           (e) 
Appendix 2: The partial derivative of Country 2’s welfare function with respect to t 






























































































































































                                (a)  







































2 2 1 2
1 β α
                                       (b) 
Appendix 3: The partial derivative of the global welfare function with respect to t  
Given Appendix 1 and 2, the partial derivative of the global welfare function is: 
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1 1 1                                     (b) 
Appendix 4: The partial derivative of Country 1’s welfare function with respect to T  
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1 1 1 α                            (b) 
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This can be simplified by making use of equation (7):  
() β α β + = ∂ ∂ T P a D1                                            (d) 

































































1                           (e) 
Appendix 5: The partial derivative of Country 2’s welfare function with respect to T 
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Appendix 6: The partial derivative of the global welfare function with respect to T  
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  20Appendix 7: The globally optimal second-best environmental tax rate  
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t                                        (b) 
Appendix 8: The globally optimal second-best tariff rate  
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Appendix 9: The globally optimal first-best policy mix  
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w S E t 1 1
* * ∂ ∂ − =                                              (b) 
By substituting equation (b) into equation (b) of Appendix (8), the first-best tariff becomes: 
0
* * = w T                                                    (c) 
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Appendix 10: The domestically optimal second-best environmental tax rate  
Based on Appendix 1, equation (e), the first-order condition for an interior maximum is: 
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Appendix 11: The domestically optimal second-best tariff rate  
Based on Appendix 4, equation (e), the first order condition for a maximum is: 
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Appendix 12: The domestically optimal first-best policy mix  
We substitute equation (b) of Appendix 10 into equation (b) of Appendix 11: 
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w P P P P ∂ ∂ = ε  . 






























































β                          (b) 
By substituting equation (b) into equation (b) of Appendix (11), T becomes: 
* *
1
( )() β ε − − − = 1 1 1
* *
1
a a D S T                                                (c) 
Appendix 13: Welfare effects of trade liberalization 
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Appendix 14: Calculation of  t ∂ ∂ε  
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